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I.

INTRODUCTION

I
W
I

n 1959, one of the first authors addressing the issue of neutrality in outer
space asked whether the topic “looms as a defiance of common sense.” 1
Although space operations were still in their infancy, Verplaetse correctly
foresaw that outer space would be increasingly used for military purposes,
which, of course, raised the question of whether, and to what extent, such
uses would be governed by the law of armed conflict, including the law of
neutrality. However, Verplaetse did not discuss the law of neutrality with a
view towards protecting neutral space objects, instead, he analyzed it with a
view to a then still probable appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies
by States that had, or were about to have, the necessary technology to do so.
Article II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty resolved this issue by providing
that outer space was not subject to claims of sovereignty,2 but this does not
necessarily mean that the issue of whether the law of neutrality applies in
outer space is now irrelevant.
Today, outer space has undoubtedly become the fourth domain of
warfare. While military confrontation in outer space have not yet occurred,
space objects, such as satellites, play an increasingly important role in military
operations, whether in times of peace or during an armed conflict.
Obviously, hostilities that extend to, or are conducted in, outer space may
have an impact on the rights of States not party to the conflict to use outer
space for space navigation and on their space objects and assets. From this
premise, various conclusions have been drawn, in particular with regard to
the protection of neutral space objects against attack or undue interference
by the belligerents. However, all too often those conclusions are based on a
misconception of the law of neutrality. The law of neutrality, stricto sensu, is
predominantly territorial in nature and its application to armed hostilities
conducted in or through outer space is considerably limited. Accordingly,
while at one time it was almost untenable to assert that the law of neutrality
applies to belligerent military operations in outer space, such an assertion
does not now defy common sense.

1. Julian G. Verplaetse, The Law of War and Neutrality in Outer Space, 29 NORDIC JOURNAL
49, 49 (1959).
2. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY

A. Object and Purpose
Neutrality has been defined “as the attitude of impartiality adopted by third
States towards belligerents and recognized by belligerents, such attitude
creating rights and duties between the impartial States and the belligerents.”3
The overall object and purpose of the law of neutrality is to prevent
escalation of an international armed conflict.4 Accordingly, States that
choose not to participate on behalf of either party to the conflict are obliged
to remain impartial vis-à-vis the belligerents, to prevent or terminate any
violation of their neutrality by the belligerents, and to tolerate belligerent
measures taken in accordance with the law of armed conflict, including the
law of neutrality. The belligerents, on their part, are obliged to respect the
sovereignty and jurisdiction of neutral States and to refrain from any activity
incompatible with the law of neutrality.
B. Distinction from Prize Law and Targeting Law
In view of its primary purpose, it is not entirely correct, as some have done,
to consider the law of neutrality as “an effort to maintain international trade
during wars.”5 The majority of the provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention
V6 and Convention XIII7 were not designed to protect neutral trade interests,
but to protect neutral territory by prohibiting certain belligerent uses. Neutral
trade interests are dealt with only marginally in Article 7 of Convention V8
and in Articles 6 to 8 of Convention XIII.9 One may, therefore, question
3. L. OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 653 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th
ed. 1952).
4. See, e.g., Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, “Benevolent” Third States in International Armed
Conflicts: The Myth of the Irrelevance of the Law of Neutrality, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF YORAM DINSTEIN 543, 565 (Michael Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007).
5. Michel Bourbonnière, The Ambit of the Law of Neutrality and Space Security, 36 ISRAEL
YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 205, 226 (2006).
6. Convention No. V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons
in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540 [hereinafter Hague
Convention No. V].
7. Convention No. XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval
War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, T.S. No. 545 [hereinafter Hague Convention No. XIII].
8. Hague Convention No. V, supra note 6, art. 7.
9. Hague Convention No. XIII, supra note 7, arts. 6–8.
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whether the law of neutrality can be relied upon to preserve “freedom of
neutral navigation in space” and to identify “the acceptable space
commercial activities of neutral States vis-à-vis belligerents.”10
Neutral trade interests are not the subject of the law of neutrality as laid
down in the two Hague Conventions, but of the law of prize,11 which was
first codified in the 1856 Paris Declaration,12 and later in the 1909 London
Declaration13 and the 1923 Hague Rules.14 The San Remo Manual,15 Helsinki
Principles,16 and Air and Missile Warfare Manual (AMW Manual),17 which at
least in part address neutrality, have been widely acknowledged as reflecting
current customary law. Of course, prize law may be considered another facet
of the law of neutrality in its application to neutral merchant vessels and civil
aircraft and their cargoes. However, prize law also applies to enemy
merchant vessels and civil aircraft and, because of that, is not exclusively part
of the law of neutrality. Moreover, prize law addresses neutral States only in
an indirect manner. It concerns neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft,
including their cargoes, as distinguished from State vessels and State aircraft.
The neutral flag State or State of registration is bound by prize law only
insofar as it must tolerate the exercise of lawful prize measures taken by the
belligerents. It may claim, at most, a violation of its jurisdiction by a
10. Bourbonnière, supra note 5, at 226.
11. On prize law, see C. J. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 675–
99, 753–93 (6th rev. ed. 1967); ERIK CASTRÉN, THE PRESENT LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY 545–65 (1954); James Kraska, Prize Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/
law-9780199231690-e383?rskey=Y6QBoz&result=3&prd=EPIL (article last updated Dec.
2009).
12. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Consol. T.S. 1, 15 MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL (ser. 1) 791, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 89 (1907) [hereinafter Paris Declaration].
13. Declaration Concerning the Laws of Maritime War, Feb. 26, 1909, reprinted in THE
DECLARATION OF LONDON, February 26, 1909, at 112 (James B. Scott ed., 1919).
14. Commission of Jurists, Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in
Time of War and Air Warfare, Feb. 23, 1923, reprinted in 32 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 12 (1938) [hereinafter 1923 Hague Rules].
15. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise Doswald Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO MANUAL].
16. Committee on Maritime Neutrality, International Law Association, Helsinki Principles on the Law of Maritime Neutrality, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION REPORT OF THE
68TH CONFERENCE 497 (1998).
17. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2009) [hereinafter
AMW MANUAL].
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belligerent and, even then, only if a claim by the private owner brought
before a duly established prize court has proven unsuccessful.18
Even if belligerent measures against neutral trade or other commercial
activities are considered to be governed by the law of neutrality as
understood in a wider sense (i.e., by including prize law), its practical
relevance in outer space would be considerably limited. It has been rightly
stated that “current technology does not permit interception . . . and
inspection of space assets” and that “space navigation is predicated upon
predictable orbital parameters or orbital coordinates.”19 Accordingly, it is
difficult to see how the law of neutrality, even including prize law, could
contribute to the protection of commercial (and other) rights neutral States
enjoy in outer space. Such rights, which continue to apply to relations
between belligerents and neutral States, are part and parcel of outer space
law.20 Additionally, space objects and assets used by a neutral State for noncommercial government purposes enjoy sovereign immunity,21 which the
belligerents are bound to respect if the State has not become a party to the
conflict. This is not necessarily an obligation under the law of neutrality, but
rather under the general rules and principles of international law, in particular
the sovereign equality of States, that continue to apply in relations between
belligerents and neutral States.22

18. According to prize law, every prize must be brought into a port for adjudication.
See COLOMBOS, supra note 11, at 801–25. Thus, it is doubtful whether the neutral flag State
is entitled to exercise its right of diplomatic protection. If such a right is acknowledged, it is
subject to the exhaustion of local remedies rule. For a discussion of the exhaustion rule, see
James R. Crawford & Thomas D. Grant, Local Remedies, Exhaustion of, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/
law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e59?rskey=ZgA4lb&result=1&prd=EPIL
(article last updated Jan. 2007).
19. Bourbonnière, supra note 5, at 226.
20. For an overview, see Vladen S. Vereshchetin, Outer Space, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:
epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1202?rskey=WhUdlf&result=2&prd=EPIL
(article last updated June 2006).
21. Although not explicitly provided for in treaties, this follows from the sovereign
immunity of State property. Certainly, warships, military aircraft and all other State vehicles
enjoy sovereign immunity. Hence, the same principle applies to State spacecraft and other
space objects.
22. See, e.g., Michael Bothe, The Law of Neutrality, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 449, 449 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013).
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A similar misconception of the law of neutrality exists with regard to the
targeting of neutral space objects and assets.23 Attacks against neutral space
objects and assets are governed by the law of targeting, which can hardly be
perceived as a sub-category of the law of neutrality. If neutral space objects
and assets make an effective contribution to a belligerent’s military action by
reason of their location, use or purpose, they become lawful military
objectives and may be attacked if the attack offers a definite military
advantage and if the other rules of targeting law (e.g., precautions in attack
and the prohibition of indiscriminate attack) are observed. As in the case of
prize law, it would be theoretically possible to consider the rules of the law
of armed conflict regulating attacks against neutral objects as belonging to
the law of neutrality.24 Such a distinction, however, would be overly artificial
and not very helpful. With regard to belligerent attacks against neutral space
objects and assets, it is certainly not correct to rely on the fundamental
obligation of belligerents to respect the inviolability of neutral States as
codified in Article 1 of Convention V and Article 1 of Convention XIII.25
That obligation is strictly limited to neutral territory; it does not protect
objects and assets located outside neutral territory that do not enjoy
sovereign immunity. Moreover, it is generally agreed that a neutral State may
not claim a violation of either its sovereignty or its jurisdiction if a belligerent
has attacked its space objects and assets that qualify as lawful targets.26 The
neutral State must tolerate the exercise of such belligerent rights if, and to
the extent, they comply with the rules and principles of targeting law.
In sum, the law of neutrality is a rather unreliable legal yardstick from
which to measure the extent of the protection accorded neutral space objects
and assets against belligerent interference. Either the law of neutrality is (1)
to be understood in a narrow sense by limiting its scope to the provisions of
Conventions V and XIII, (2) cannot be applied to outer space for practical
reasons, (3) is silent on targeting issues or (4) adds nothing because it would
simply be repetitive of the rules and principles of general international law,
23. See Michel Bourbonnière & Ricky J. Lee, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello Considerations
on the Targeting of Satellites: The Targeting of Post-Modern Military Space Assets, 44 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 167, 213–16 (2014); Bourbonnière, supra note 5, at 221–22.
24. For example, the AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, deals with attacks against neutral
aircraft in Rule 174, which is located in Section X, entitled “Neutrality.”
25. See Bourbonnière & Lee, supra note 23, at 213; Bourbonnière, supra note 5, at 218.
26. This result follows from the fact that the neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft,
which make an effective contribution to the enemy’s military action by use, are liable to
attack. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, ¶¶ 67, 70; AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, r.
174.
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which continue to have binding effect in relations between belligerents and
neutral States. Of course, belligerents may not prevent neutral States from
exercising their freedoms under the law of outer space. This prohibition,
however, does not follow from the law of neutrality. Belligerents may not
attack neutral space objects and assets unless they qualify as lawful targets,
and they may not attack lawful targets if the attack may be expected to cause
excessive collateral damage. Again, these prohibitions and obligations are not
part of the law of neutrality but follow from the law of targeting that, other
than prize law, does not distinguish between enemy and neutral status.
III.

SCOPE OF APPLICABILITY

Although there seems to be no consensus among States as to the continuing
validity of the law of neutrality,27 it is accepted that neutrality only applies
ratione materiae—in situations of international armed conflict; ratione
personae—to States that are not parties to an international armed conflict; and
ratione temporis—as long as a State chooses not to participate on the side of
either belligerent and as long as the international armed conflict lasts.28
According to the position taken here, it is quite doubtful whether—ratione
loci—it also applies in outer space.
A. Ratione Materiae et Ratione Personae
While there is agreement on the limitation of the law of neutrality to
situations of international armed conflict, as distinguished from noninternational armed conflict, it is unsettled whether it only applies in
international armed conflicts “of a certain duration and intensity.”29 It is true
that the practical relevance of the law of neutrality will be quite limited in an
international armed conflict of short duration. For instance, the rules of
Convention XIII on belligerent use of neutral waters30 will be unlikely to
come into operation in such a conflict. However, the inviolability of neutral
territory, including neutral waters, must be observed during any international
27. See Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 4, at 544–56.
28. Id. at 558–60.
29. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF
WAR MANUAL § 15.2.1.2 (rev. ed. Dec. 2016) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL].
30. Hague Convention No. XIII, supra note 7, arts. 10–25; see also COLOMBOS, supra
note 11, at 650–51; CASTRÉN, supra note 11, at 514–31; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15,
¶¶ 20–21.
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armed conflict, irrespective of its intensity or duration. All States not parties
to the international armed conflict must remain impartial and abstain from
unneutral conduct in order to preserve the very function of the law of
neutrality (i.e., to prevent an escalation of the armed conflict).31 In this
author’s view, the essentialia neutralitatis, that is, the core rules of the law of
neutrality, therefore apply in all situations of international armed conflict.32
These rules regulate the relations between the belligerents and all States not
parties to the conflict.33
Although there is no intermediate status of “non-belligerency” that
would allow neutral States to discriminate between the belligerents because
one belligerent has (allegedly) resorted to a use of force contrary to its
obligations under the UN Charter,34 the jus ad bellum may impact the
applicability of the law of neutrality. According to a generally held view, no
State may rely upon the law of neutrality if the Security Council has taken
“binding preventive or enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations – including the authorization of the use of
force by a particular State or group of States.”35
B. Ratione Temporis
Ratione temporis the law of neutrality applies until the end of an international
armed conflict, which depends upon either the “cessation of active
hostilities”36 or on the “general close of military operations.”37 If a neutral
State decides to become a party to the conflict it is no longer bound and
protected by the law of neutrality.38 It is important to note that mere violation
of neutral obligations, such as the duty of impartiality, will not render a
neutral State a party to the conflict. Hence, the law of neutrality ceases to
apply only if, and to the extent, the neutral State resorts to a use of force
31. CASTRÉN, supra note 11, at 470–87.
32. Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 4, at 565–67.
33. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, ¶ 13(d); AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, r. 1(aa).
34. See Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 4, at 544–56.
35. AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, r. 165; see also SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, ¶¶
7–9.
36. Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
37. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 3(a), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3.
38. CASTRÉN, supra note 11, at 470–87.
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against one of the belligerents.39 This may include attacks, whether from
Earth or from outer space, against belligerent space objects and assets that
enjoy sovereign immunity.
C. Ratione Loci
As seen, an extension of the applicability of the law of neutrality to outer
space does not seem tenable. States agree that
law of war treaties and the customary law of war are understood to regulate
the conduct of hostilities, regardless of where they are conducted, which
would include the conduct of hostilities in outer space. In this way, the
application of the law of war to activities in outer space is the same as its
application to activities in other environments, such as the land, sea, air, or
cyber domains.40

Such statements do not, however, justify the conclusion that States also agree
on the application of the law of neutrality in outer space. The law of
neutrality may be considered a branch or sub-category of the law of armed
conflict, but States have to date refrained from making positive statements
as to its applicability to outer space.41
The law of neutrality as codified in Conventions V and XIII is
intrinsically linked to the territorial sovereignty of neutral States. Under
Article 1 belligerents are obliged to respect the inviolability of the “territory
of neutral Powers”42 and of “neutral waters.”43 The prohibitions on
belligerents relate to conduct in the territory and territorial waters of neutral
States.44 The obligations of neutral States equally relate to belligerent uses of

39. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE
FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶¶ 217–43
(2016).
40. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 29, § 14.10.2.2.
41. For example, Chapter XV of the DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, which deals with
the law of neutrality, does not mention outer space or neutral space objects.
42. Hague Convention No. V, supra note 6.
43. Hague Convention No. XIII, supra note 7.
44. Hague Convention No. V, supra note 6, arts. 1–4; Hague Convention No. XIII,
supra note 7, arts. 1–5.
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their territory and waters,45 or to other activities occurring within their
territory over which the neutral State is able to exercise effective control.46
According to Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, “outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by
any other means.” Prior to the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967,
it was unsettled whether States were allowed to extend their sovereignty into
outer space.47 Today, Article II is considered to reflect customary
international law because outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, is a res communis omnium.48 Accordingly, Conventions V and XIII are
not applicable in outer space because any claim of territorial sovereignty by
a neutral State would lack a legal basis.
In this context, it is important to note that the mere exercise of
jurisdiction or effective control is not sufficient to bring into operation the
law of neutrality. A State may exercise its prescriptive and/or enforcement
jurisdiction in outer space by, for example, regulating mining activities on
celestial bodies.49 This, however, does not result in an extension of the State’s
territorial sovereignty to that object. A belligerent’s obligation to refrain from
interfering with a neutral State’s exercise of jurisdiction in outer space does
not stem from the law of neutrality, but from either general international law,
space law or the law of targeting. And even if the law of neutrality was
understood in a wider sense, that is, to include belligerent measures other
than attacks against neutral space objects and assets, these rules would, at
present, fail to apply in outer space for practical reasons. The fact that outer
space is being used by public and private actors for various purposes and
that it is a res communis omnium may justify an assimilation of outer space to
the high seas. Nonetheless, it does not justify a conclusion that the law of

45. Hague Convention No. V, supra note 6, arts. 5, 11–19; Hague Convention No. XIII,
supra note 7, arts. 8, 10–25.
46. Hague Convention No. V, supra note 6, arts. 6–8; Hague Convention No. XIII,
supra note 7, arts. 7–8.
47. Verplaetse, supra note 1, at 52.
48. Vereshchetin, supra note 20, ¶ 5.
49. In November 2015, the United States enacted legislation that would permit U.S.
citizens to engage in commercial exploration and recovery of space resources. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129 Stat. 704 (2015). Luxembourg recently adopted a similar act. See Luxembourg Law on the Exploration and Use of Space
Resources Entered into Force, ARENDT (Aug. 2, 2017), http://www.arendt.com/publications/pages/luxembourg-law-exploration-use-space-resources-into-force.aspx.
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neutrality is “necessary for the maintenance of the global public order”50 and,
therefore, applicable in outer space.
IV.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES LINKED TO TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY

Although the law of neutrality does not apply to outer space activities—
whether those of a belligerent or neutral—this does not mean it is irrelevant
with regard to the conduct of hostilities in or through outer space. In
particular, if military space operations can be linked to neutral territory, the
law of neutrality determines the rights and obligations of belligerent and
neutral States by modifying or amending the peacetime rules that, in
principle, continue to apply.
A. Inviolability of Neutral Territory and Neutral Airspace
According to Article 1 of Convention V the territory of neutral States is
inviolable.51 Article 1 of Convention XIII may be interpreted as extending
the inviolability of neutral territory to “neutral waters,” which “consist of the
internal waters, territorial sea, and, where applicable, the archipelagic waters
of neutral States.”52 Neither Convention addresses neutral airspace (i.e., the
airspace above neutral territory and neutral waters), but, according to
customary international law, neutral national airspace is equally inviolable.53
The inviolability of neutral territory, neutral waters and neutral airspace is
not limited to the explicit prohibitions of Articles 2 through 5 of Convention
V and Articles 1 through 5 of Convention XIII, nor to the customary
prohibitions restated in the San Remo Manual and the AMW Manual.54 Rather,
belligerents must refrain from any violation of the territorial sovereignty of
neutral States.55 This includes damage inflicted to neutral territory from outer
space.
In this context, it is important to emphasize that the rules governing
belligerent uses of neutral airspace may not be transferred to outer space.
50. Bourbonnière, supra note 5, at 216.
51. Hague Convention No. V, supra note 6, art. 1.
52. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, ¶ 14.
53. AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, r. 170(a); SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, ¶ 14;
see also 1923 Hague Rules, supra note 14, arts. 39–40.
54. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, ¶¶ 15–18; AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, rr.
166–67, 170–72.
55. See, e.g., CASTRÉN, supra note 11, at 459–65.
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Bourbonnière interprets Article 40 of the 1923 Hague Rules, according to
which “belligerent military aircraft are forbidden to enter the jurisdiction of
a neutral State,” as follows:
Although strictly speaking this paradigm cannot easily be transposed to
apply to space assets and their applications, from a space law conceptual
perspective the use of the word ‘jurisdiction’ is nonetheless very interesting.
Considering that sovereign territory in outer space does not exist but that
States have ‘jurisdiction and control’ over their space assets, by transposing
the Hague Rules paradigm involving the use of the term ‘jurisdiction’,
interference with the national jurisdiction of States in outer space could be
determined to be a violation of neutral rights.56

The use of “jurisdiction” instead of “national airspace” in the 1923 Hague
Rules may not be understood as extending the prohibition of Article 40 to
all aspects of a neutral State’s jurisdiction. First, the use of the verb “enter”
indicates that the drafters considered what they described as “jurisdiction”
to be a certain space or area, hence, the verb may not be interpreted as
meaning “to violate.” Second, even if the wording of Article 40 was meant
to include more than the national airspace of neutral States, it would be
obsolete today. According to customary international law, the prohibition is
limited to the “incursion or transit by military aircraft into or through neutral
airspace.”57 Third, as stated above, the rules are designed to protect the
territorial sovereignty of neutral States. Fourth, the jurisdictional rights
neutral States enjoy outside their territories are the subject of the law of prize
and the law of targeting; they are not as protected as though they are within
the territorial sovereignty of neutral States.
B. Prohibited Uses of Neutral Territory and Neutral Airspace
The exercise of belligerent rights in neutral territory, neutral waters and
neutral airspace is prohibited.58 Specifically, in those areas belligerents are
prohibited from engaging in hostile actions, establishing bases of operations
or using them as a sanctuary.59 The same holds true for “any other activity
56. Bourbonnière, supra note 5, at 220.
57. AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, r. 170(a); see also SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15,
¶ 18; 1923 Hague Rules, supra note 14, arts. 40–41.
58. AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, rr. 166–67; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, ¶ 16.
59. Hague Convention No. XIII, supra note 7, art. 5; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note
15, ¶ 17; AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, r. 167(a).
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involving the use of military force or contributing to the war-fighting
effort.”60 Accordingly, the launching of belligerent military space objects
from neutral territory constitutes a violation of neutrality.
This prohibition applies even if the neutral State, because of an
agreement (servitude, lease or status of forces agreement) with the
belligerent, is prevented from exercising its territorial jurisdiction in the area
of the launching site. When a prohibited use occurs of its territory, territorial
waters or national airspace occurs, the neutral State is obliged to take the
measures necessary to terminate the violation of its neutrality.61 In this
instance, in this author’s view, the obligations under the law of neutrality
prevail over the agreement with the belligerent. If the neutral State is
unwilling or unable to terminate the violation of its neutrality and if the
violation is serious, the aggrieved belligerent is entitled to use proportionate
force to terminate the violation.62 The fact that in past international armed
conflicts (e.g., during the 2003 Iraq War) neutral States tolerated uses of their
territory by a belligerent inconsistent with the law of neutrality and that the
aggrieved belligerent did not respond is inadequate evidence of State practice
to justify the conclusion that these rules of the law of neutrality have become
obsolete. The neutral States were simply in the fortunate position that the
aggrieved belligerent lacked the military capability to effectively respond to
the violation.
Seemingly, because there is no consensus on a definition of outer space
and its delimitation from airspace,63 it is not settled whether belligerents are
prohibited from launching space objects outside neutral territory or neutral
waters if the space object transits neutral airspace before reaching outer
space. Moreover, some States have taken the position that, although the
space above 100 to 110 kilometers would be considered outer space, other
States would retain a right of passage below that altitude “for the purpose of
reaching orbit or returning to earth.”64 Irrespective of whether this position
is reflective of customary law, it cannot be considered to apply to the national
airspace of neutral States in times of international armed conflict. It is
generally agreed that “any incursion or transit by a belligerent aircraft
(including a UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle]/UCAV [unmanned combat
60. AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, r. 171(d).
61. Hague Convention No. V, supra note 6, art. 5; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15,
¶ 22; AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, r. 168; 1923 Hague Rules, supra note 14, art. 42.
62. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, ¶ 22; AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, r. 168.
63. Vereshchetin, supra note 20, ¶¶ 8–14.
64. Id., ¶ 12.
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aerial vehicle]) or missile into or through neutral airspace is prohibited.”65
This prohibition must be extended to military space objects, including
spacecraft, transiting neutral national airspace.
Article 10 of Convention XIII, according to which the “neutrality of a
Power is not affected by the mere passage through its territorial waters of
warships or prizes belonging to belligerents,” does not support the
conclusion that belligerents are entitled to launch military space objects via
neutral national airspace. In neutral waters, the ships of all States enjoy
certain passage rights. The peacetime right of innocent passage in the
territorial sea and, where applicable, archipelagic waters, continues to apply
in times of armed conflict66 unless a neutral States has, in accordance with
the law of maritime neutrality, prohibited belligerent warships from
exercising that right.67 Such passage or transit rights do not exist in neutral
national airspace however it is defined and delimited from outer space. A
neutral State is not entitled to allow belligerent aircraft or spacecraft the use
of its national airspace, including for the purpose of transiting to outer space.
To the contrary, if belligerent military aircraft or spacecraft enter neutral
airspace, the neutral State “must use all means at its disposal to prevent or
terminate that violation.”68 Again, if the neutral State is unwilling or unable
to comply with its duty of preventing or terminating the violation of its
national airspace, the opposing belligerent “may, in the absence of any
feasible and timely alternative, use such force as is necessary to terminate the
violation,”69 as the belligerent’s use of the airspace would consitutte a serious
violation of neutrality
C. Belligerent Use of Communications Infrastructure Located in Neutral Territory
According to Article 3 of Convention V, belligerents are
forbidden to—

65. AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, r. 170(a). A UAV is an unmanned aerial vehicle; a
UCAV is an unmanned combat aerial vehicle. Id. at 6.
66. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, ¶¶ 31–33. Note that neutral States may not
“suspend, hamper, or otherwise impede the right of transit passage nor the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage.” Id., ¶ 29.
67. Id., ¶ 19.
68. AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, r. 170(c); 1923 Hague Rules, supra note 14, art. 42.
69. AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, r. 168(b); see also SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15,
¶ 22 (stating that the use of force much be “strictly” necessary).
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(a) erect on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless telegraphy station or
other apparatus for the purpose of communicating with belligerent forces
on land or sea; (b) use any installation of this kind established by them
before the war on the territory of a neutral Power for purely military
purposes, and which has not been opened for the service of public
messages.

Similarly, Article 5 of Convention XIII prohibits belligerents from erecting
in neutral ports and waters “wireless telegraphy stations or any apparatus for
the purpose of communicating with the belligerent forces on land or sea.”
The wording—“or any apparatus”—is sufficiently broad to permit the
prohibition to be extended to the erection and use in neutral territory of
ground stations controlling, or communicating data to, military space
objects. The fact that the prohibitions are limited to communications with
belligerent land and sea forces is not an obstacle to such an extension. Even
if Articles 3 and 5 were understood literally, which would exclude
communication with belligerent military space objects and assets, there is
today general agreement that the erection and use of such installations is to
be considered a “hostile action” because the belligerent would be using
neutral territory as a base of operations.70
The prohibition of Article 3(b) is not absolute in nature. In view of its
wording, it is arguable that the use of preexisting belligerent communications
infrastructure in neutral territory, including ground stations, is not prohibited
if it is not exclusively used for military purposes. This would exclude from
the prohibition the use of any belligerent communications infrastructure that
also serves non-military purposes. It must be borne in mind, however, that
this would apply only if the communications infrastructure was also open
for sending and receiving public messages. The use of the word “and”
indicates that the two requirements must be fulfilled concurrently and, in
reality, ground stations designed for the communication with military
satellites will not be open for the service of public messages. If a belligerent
uses its communication infrastructure located in neutral territory for military
purposes in violation of Article 3 or of Article 5, the neutral State is obliged
to take the measures necessary to terminate the violation, even if the
infrastructure is located in an area in which it is prevented from exercising
territorial jurisdiction.71

70. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, ¶ 16.
71. AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, r. 168(b); SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, ¶ 22.
540

Neutrality and Outer Space

Vol. 93

Another provision concerning belligerent uses of neutral
communications infrastructure is Article 8 of Convention V, which provides,
“A neutral Power is not called upon to forbid or restrict the use on behalf
of the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy
apparatus belonging to it or to companies or private individuals.”72 Whereas
Article 3 of Convention V and Article 5 of Convention XIII apply to
communications infrastructure belonging to a belligerent located in neutral
territory, Article 8 applies to infrastructure belonging to either the neutral
State or to private individuals or companies.73 Arguably, the provision is
applicable to any communications infrastructure, including neutral ground
stations and satellites (although the latter are not within neutral territory).
The word “use” can be extrapolated to include “a long-term leased capacity
or commercial acquisition of satellite services, such as mobile satellite
telecommunications and remote sensing imagery.”74 Still, it is questionable
whether this would be reconcilable with the neutral obligation of abstaining
from any activity in support of belligerent military operations. In particular,
the provision of remote sensing imagery or other satellite capacity or services
that are used for target acquisition purposes could be considered by the
opposing belligerent as an act of active involvement in the hostilities, even if
the neutral State is prepared to provide the services impartially to all the
belligerents. On the other hand, the States parties to Convention V did not
exclude from Article 8’s authorization of the continued use of neutral
communications infrastructure the transmission of information of military
significance, hence, under Article 8 the provision of such capacity or services
does not violate the law of neutrality, provided the neutral communications
infrastructure is made available impartially to all belligerents.
It is important to emphasize that a determination that the activity does
not violate the law of neutrality is without prejudice to the question of
whether a neutral satellite qualifies as a lawful target. The fact that a neutral
State acts in compliance with the law of neutrality does not exclude a neutral
object from becoming a military objective by reason of its use. It is,
therefore, not reasonable to hold that “the mere availability of such capacity
or services provided by a neutral State or a person or entity of its nationality
would not be sufficient to make their satellite a legitimate target for armed
attack.”75 This conclusion confuses the law of neutrality with the law of
72. Hague Convention No. V, supra note 6, art. 8.
73. Id.
74. Bourbonnière & Lee, supra note 23, at 214.
75. Id.
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targeting. Neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft are liable to be attacked
as lawful targets if they “are incorporated into or assist the enemy’s
intelligence system.”76 There is no logical operational or legal reason why
neutral satellites should be treated differently. It is important to note that the
vessels and aircraft may be attacked only if they are outside neutral territory
or neutral waters. Whereas an attack against neutral communications
infrastructure located in neutral territory would be unlawful, even if it
qualified as a military objective by its use, an attack against a neutral satellite
(or any other neutral space object) that makes an effective contribution to
the enemy’s military action would be lawful under the law of armed conflict.77
D. Exports from Neutral Territory
According to Article 7 of Convention V and the identical Article 7 of
Convention XIII, a neutral State is not obliged “to prevent the export or
transport, on behalf of one or other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions
of war, or, in general, of anything which can be of use to an army or a fleet.”78
These provisions apply to military space objects, remote sensing data, and to
any other satellite services, as long as they are provided by private companies
or individuals.79 The fact that many States have implemented far-reaching
export control regimes under their domestic law does not imply an obligation
under the law of neutrality also to apply them to the parties to an
international armed conflict.
The law of neutrality is, however, less liberal with regard to the “supply,
in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral Power to a belligerent
Power, of warships, ammunition, or war material of any kind whatever.”80 In
76. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, ¶ 70(d); AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, r. 174(d);
1923 Hague Rules, supra note 14, art. 6(1).
77. Interestingly, Bourbonnière arrives at the same conclusion, although he previously
expressed doubts as to whether the neutral satellite qualified as a lawful target. Bourbonnière, supra note 5, at 221
In applying this rule [Article 6(1) of the 1923 Hague Rules] to space based earth imaging it
can be cogently argued that the transmission of earth imaging data and/or of the information resulting from the processed data, which has either tactical or strategic significance,
in real time to a belligerent is a hostile act. In these circumstances the ‘neutral’ or private
space asset violating these norms would then be liable to capture or attack as a legitimate
military objective.

78. See also 1923 Hague Rules, supra note 14, art. 45.
79. Bourbonnière, supra note 5, at 220.
80. Hague Convention No. XIII, supra note 7, art. 6; see also 1923 Hague Rules, supra
note 14, art. 44.
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other words, the law prohibits neutral States, as distinct from neutral
nationals, from engaging in such activities. Accordingly, it can be concluded
that the “supply by a neutral State of earth imaging data to a belligerent,
either raw or processed, would then be a violation of neutrality.”81
According to Article 8 of Convention XIII, a neutral government is
under an obligation of due diligence
to employ the means at its disposal to prevent the fitting out or arming of
any vessel within its jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended
to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, against a Power with which that
Government is at peace. It is also bound to display the same vigilance to
prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise,
or engage in hostile operations, which had been adapted entirely or partly
within the said jurisdiction for use in war.82

Thus,
it can be argued that a State must use due diligence to prevent the launch
of a satellite from its territory when it has reasonable grounds to believe
that the satellite is intended for military use in a conflict within which it is
neutral. Similarly a neutral State is bound to employ the means at its
disposal to prevent the fitting or arming of a satellite within its territory
which it has reason to believe is intended for hostile operation against a
belligerent with which it is at peace.83

In view of the overall object of the law of neutrality, that is, the prevention
of the escaltion of an international armed conflict, neutral States must refrain
from providing any direct support of military equipment, such as objects
intended for military operations in or through outer space, or militarily
relevant material, such as staellite imagery, to the belligerents. Their
obligation to prevent their nationals (individuals or companies) from
supplying a belligerent is, however, limited to satellites and space objects
designed for military uses in or through outer space.

81. Bourbonnière, supra note 5, at 220.
82. 1923 Hague Rules, supra note 14, art. 46.
83. Bourbonnière, supra note 5, at 221.
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E. Duty of Impartiality
It has been shown that a neutral State is not obliged to prevent all belligerent
uses of its territory or of the infrastructure located within its territory. In an
exercise of its sovereign prerogative it may, however, impose conditions,
restrictions or prohibitions on the provision by private companies or
individuals of military space objects, remote sensing data and any other
satellite services, and on the use of their communications infrastructure,
including ground stations controlling satellites. If the neutral State so
decides, it is obliged to apply the conditions, restrictions or prohibitions
impartially to all belligerents.84
V.

FURTHER ISSUES

Finally, there are some issues that, strictly speaking, are not governed by the
law of neutrality, but must be briefly addressed for reasons of completeness.
A. Entitlement to Exercise Belligerent Rights in Outer Space
The first issue relates to the question whether belligerents are obliged in the
exercise of its belligerent rights in outer space to use only space objects that
fulfill the conditions applicable to warships and military aircraft. This
question arises because in naval warfare and air warfare the exercise of
belligerent rights is limited to warships and military aircraft.85 Other vessels
or aircraft, even if they qualify as State vehicles enjoying sovereign immunity,
are not entitled to exercise belligerent rights.86 If outer space is assimilated to
the high seas and to international airspace as a res communis omnium that all
States are entitled to use for commercial and military purposes, there may be
a need to limit the exercise of belligerent rights to belligerent space objects
84. Hague Convention No. V, supra note 6, art. 9; Hague Convention No. XIII, supra
note 7, art. 9.
85. 1923 Hague Rules, supra note 14, art. 13; AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, r. 17. With
regard to warships, this follows from the prohibition of privateering under the 1856 Paris
Declaration. See also Robert W. Tucker, The Naval Forces of Belligerents, 50 INTERNATIONAL
LAW STUDIES 38, 38 (1955).
86. See PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE
WARFARE r. 17 cmt. 2 (2010) (“Just like civilian aircraft, State aircraft other than military
aircraft are not entitled to engage in attacks, even if they are owned by or under the exclusive
control of the armed forces and being used for government non-commercial service.”).
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(1) operated by the armed forces of a State, (2) bearing the military markings
of that State, (3) commanded by a member of the armed forces and (4)
manned or preprogrammed by a crew subject to regular military discipline.87
The strict requirements of the law of naval and air warfare are closely linked
to the prohibition of privateering under the 1856 Paris Declaration88 and to
the need of neutral ships and aircraft to be able to clearly distinguish a lawful
exercise of belligerent rights from acts of privateering (or of piracy). In view
of a lack of a consistent State practice, it is, however, doubtful that the
principle of transparency also applies in outer space. For the foreseeable
future belligerents will not have the capability to exercise prize measures in
outer space. Space navigation will continue to be “predicated upon
predictable orbital parameters or orbital coordinates.”89 Accordingly, it is
unnecessary to limit the exercise of belligerent rights in outer space to space
objects or spacecraft that comply with the requirements applicable to
warships and military aircraft.
B. Belligerent Use of Neutral Space Objects
Another issue concerns the use by belligerents of neutral space objects for
military purposes. This raises the question of whether international law
provides sufficiently clear standards for the determination of the nationality
of space objects. Unfortunately, space law treaties do not define nationality
and, thus, do not provide guidance as to the determination of the neutral
status of a space object.90 The treaties either refer to the “launching
authority,” the “launchings State,” “jurisdiction and control” established
through registration, which is reserved to the launching State or States, or to
“ownership.”91 It has been rightly stated that jurisdiction and control may
not coincide with ownership, and that it is difficult to determine “the legal
status of a satellite as an asset of either a belligerent or neutral State.”92
Moreover, a satellite may be under the jurisdiction and control of a neutral
State, but the “payload may be subject to independent command and control
87. AMW MANUAL, supra note 17, r. 1(x).
88. Paris Declaration, supra note 12 (“Privateering is, and remains, abolished”).
89. Bourbonnière, supra note 5, at 226.
90. Id. at 217–19.
91. Stephan Hobe, Spacecraft, Satellites and Space Objects, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶¶ 10–13, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:
epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1222?rskey=Tc7awU&result=1&prd=EPIL
(article last updated June 2007).
92. Bourbonnière, supra note 5, at 219.
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from a different ground control facility.”93 To date, State practice has not
provided legal clarity on this question. In sum, without “a harmonization of
State practice on this issue,”94 the determination of the neutral status of
satellites and other space objects remains unsettled.
These difficulties are, however, less grave than they may seem at first
glance. First, whether a satellite or other space object has belligerent or
neutral status is an issue unrelated to the law of neutrality. It is, therefore,
misleading to hold that belligerents are obliged to “respect the neutrality of
a non-belligerent in outer space.”95 Second, belligerents are not prohibited
from using neutral satellites or other space objects, unless they enjoy
sovereign immunity. Third, the lawfulness of an attack against a satellite or
other space object will in most instances depend on its use (i.e., whether it
makes an effective contribution to military action), not on its nationality. The
nationality of a space object is relevant only if it contributes to military action
by its nature or if it enjoys sovereign immunity.
If a belligerent uses a neutral space object for military purposes, the
opposing belligerent would be entitled to consider it a lawful military
objective. Unless there is an urgent necessity to neutralize the object
immediately, the aggrieved belligerent is arguably obliged to request the
neutral State to terminate the use of its space object by the other belligerent.
If the neutral State is unable to comply with the request because, for
example, the payload is under the command and control of that belligerent,
the aggrieved belligerent is not obliged to refrain from an attack, provided
that the rules and principles of targeting law are observed.96
VI.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is difficult to assess the legality of the use of modern technology and of a
new domain of warfare—outer space—under rules that were adopted more
than one hundred years ago when earthbound flight itself was still in its
infancy. While the law of neutrality is of continued validity with regard to
belligerent uses of neutral territory and of infrastructure located therein, it is
not possible to extend its scope of applicability to outer space, because its
rules are predominantly linked to the territorial sovereignty of neutral States.
The efforts to assess the legality of belligerent military operations in outer
93. Bourbonnière & Lee, supra note 23, at 214.
94. Bourbonnière, supra note 5, at 219.
95. Id. at 218.
96. See Bourbonnière & Lee, supra note 23, at 214.
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space in light of the law of neutrality are based on an approach that confuses
that law with the law of targeting, or one that ignores the very nature of the
law of neutrality. Therefore, the importance of the law of neutrality should
not be overestimated or excessively interpreted in an effort to extend it to
activities in outer space. The protection of neutral space objects and of other
neutral uses of outer space against belligerent interference is sufficiently
provided for by the principles and rules of the law of armed conflict
regulating the conduct of hostilities and by the principles and rules of space
law and general international law that continue to apply in relations between
belligerents and neutral States.
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